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TEACIDNG THE LOGIC OFF ALSIFICA TION: 
A CLASSROOM EXERCISE 
David Lopatto 
Associate Professor of Psychology 
Grinnell College 
Grinnell, IA 50112 
Every science teacher soon discovers that the intuitions students 
use to solve problems are frequently at variance with the critical thinking 
skills required by science. 1be exercise presented here focuses on the value 
of making scientific hypotheses and then attempting to falsify rather than 
confirm them. 
When challenged to test a hypothesis, intuitive thinkers tend to 
show a confirmation bias, i.e., they will propose a test in which the results 
will be a positive instance of the hypothesis (Einhorn and Hogarth, 1978; 
Wason, 1960). Scientists, on the other hand, know that tests are specific 
instances that cannot inductively ''prove" the hypothesis. Instead, scien-
tists follow the lead of Karl Popper (1959), who formulated the logic of 
falsification. Popper asserted that support for a hypothesis is always 
provisional. Hypotheses cannot ever be conclusively proven. They can, 
however, be disproved. A negative test in which the hypothesis is not 
supported should cause the scientist to discard the hypothesis and try 
another. 
The difference between the confirmation bias and the logic of 
falsification can be illustrated by the following classroom demonstration. 
1be teacher begins by writing three names on the blackboard, let's say 
Arthur, Alfred, Ann. Following the names is a blank line where the next 
name will be written. 1be teacher gives the class the following task: Here 
is a scientific problem/or you to solve. I am thinking of a rule that tells 
me which names are right for this group and which are wrong for this 
group. I am not going to tell you the rule right away. Rather, I want you 
to form a hypothesis about what the rule might be. When you have formed 
your hypothesis, test that hypothesis by suggesting a name to go into the 
blank space. If your guess is consistent with the rule, I will say "Yes." If 
your guess is not consistent with the rule, I will say "No." Chances are 
that students will hypothesize that the rule is "Names beginning with A." 
If they show the confirmation bias, they will suggest names such as Andrew 
andAmy. Buttheruleisnot"NamesbeginningwithA" Theruleis"Names 
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beginning with vowels." Because Andrew and Amy begin with vowels, the 
reacher will say "Yes" after each one is suggested, and students may go on 
to further think of names beginning with A. The teacher may allow this 
hypothesis confirmation to go on for several names, and then ask a student 
to state the rule. With some confidence the student will say "Names 
beginning with A," to which the teacher replies, "No, that's not it." The 
students may exhibit surprise. 
At this point in the demonstration, the teacher should point out to 
the students that the tests of the hypothesis they had formed were all tests 
to confirm the hypothesis. The teacher should suggest that the students try 
again, only this time attempt to generate tests that disconfirm their 
hypothesis. Now students will generate names like David (no), Eliwbeth 
(yes)andsoon. By this method, they may eventually getto therule"Names 
beginning with vowels." 
The lesson can be repeated with numbers. The teacher begins by 
writing the numbers 2, 4, 6 on the board, followed by a blank line. The 
teacher repeats the instructions. Students are to form hypotheses about the 
rule that governs the numbers and suggest a number that follows the trio on 
the board Although they will be tempted to believe that the rule is "Count 
by two's," students will be more wary than before. They may suggest 8 for 
the next number, but students who have learned the lesson will not continue 
to generate 10, 12, 14, etc. Instead, they will attempt to disconfirm their 
hypothesis. By disconfirrning they may eventually discover the rule, which 
is 'Toe number has to be larger than the preceding number." 
It is useful to repeat the lesson in several ways so the students do 
not dismiss the logic of falsification as a simple and unimportant trick. 
Afterusing names and numbers, the interested teacher may be able to create 
a third example using concepts within the content area of the science course. 
One could attempt to test hypotheses about species of plants or elements in 
the periodic table, for instance. A further refinement of the process may 
occur ifit is possible for the students to have access to a laboratory. For 
example, students could be given a sample of an unknown powder (see 
Bluhm, 1991) and asked to generate tests for the hypothesis that the powder 
is sugar. Students still operating under a confirmation bias might suggest 
tasting the powder because the confirmatory point of view predicts the 
powder will taste sweet. But if the powder is in reality not sugar, it could 
be very unpalatable; students would learn the hard way to keep falsification 
in mind. 
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As a final step,itmaybe useful to have the students turn their new-
found talent at the logic of falsification to the study of a current problem in 
science. Students could consider questions regarding global warming or the 
demise of the dinosaurs. Toe value of the exercise would not be in arriving 
at a final answer, but in applying the logic of falsification to currently 
popular hypotheses about phenomena. 
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